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Borderlands of Faith: Reconsidering the Origins of a Ukrainian Tragedy
ism as the defining theoretical construct behind modern history in this area of the world, even as, in the wake of the collapsed communist system, the evolution of nationalism continues to garner attention.8 Outside our field, an innovative trend in postcolonial studies has made remarkable strides in critiquing secular nationalist theories by denying the epistemological division (made manifest during the age of Enlightenment) between religious and secular experience. Instead, this convincing new scholarship argues that the one cannot be so cleanly separated from the other, and that religious and political identity are closely intertwined.9 Such a premise (while developed through consideration of twentiethcentury phenomena) is useful both as a framework for explaining the religious violence at the heart of Koliivshchyna and for promoting the uprising as a key event in the evolution of identity in the eighteenth-century borderlands of the Russian Empire.
Evolving Lines of Explanation
In the immediate aftermath of the 1768 uprising, religious causes dominated explanations of the tensions that led to the uprising. In the subsequent century, however, as the episode was memorialized by the descendants of those who experienced the tragedy, religious causes began to recede from consideration in favor of more political explanations. Ukrainian poet Taras Slavic Review brought the event into the mainstream of the Ukrainian national myth of the nineteenth century. In Polish literature, the uprising became either "an example of cossack barbarism against Polish civilization" or a painful memory of a failed relationship with the Ukrainian population in the Commonwealth." For Poles, Koliivshchyna was another piece of evidence for discerning the causes of the demise of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. In the Jewish memory, the 1768 uprising gained a place alongside the anti-Jewish violence of the seventeenth-century cossack uprising led by Bohdan Khmel'nyts'kyi. Early twentieth-century Jewish historian Simon Dubnow condemned Koliivshchyna as a "miniature copy of the year 1648," stemming from "national and caste antagonisms."12 Historians further diluted the religious factor by underscoring perceived nationalist and socioeconomic causes. Consistently presenting the uprising within the context of haidamak disturbances-violent cossackled brigandage directed against the Polish ruling class-historians linked Koliivshchyna to the pursuit of national aspirations for Ukraine.l3 The binary assessment of Ukrainians attacking Poles, particularly in pursuit of the dream of a separate Ukrainian state, however, oversimplifies the history and relies on the wispy contours of myth. Khmel'nyts'kyi remained a hero in the popular Ukrainian imagination of the eighteenth century, but cossackdom-the key to greater political goals-had lost its broad base of power after the partitioning of Ukraine in 1667 and its removal as an independent institution within the Commonwealth. Certainly, participants in Koliivshchyna harbored antipathy toward the Polish regime. But they sought protection from Catherine II and the Russian empire, trusting in a better future linked to their eastern neighbor (ironically, given the empress's subsequent dissolution of the Zaporozhian Sich and abolition of autonomy in the Hetmanate). In other words, the issue of Ukrainian subordination, not independence based on nationalist goals, was paramount.
Among possible secular causes of tensions leading to the uprising, socioeconomic causes hold the most validity. Historians have uncovered evidence that the decades leading up to the massacre saw a decline in status 13. This term (deriving from a Turkic word meaning robber or brigand) was first utilized in 1717 to describe bands of brigands in right-bank Ukraine. Vladimir Antonovich, "Predislovie" in Arkhiv iugo-zapadnoi Rossii, part 3, vol. 3, Akty o gaidamakakh, 1700-1768 (Kiev, 1876), 10.
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Borderlands of Faith: Reconsidering the Origins of a Ukrainian Tragedy for the peasants of right-bank Ukraine. After more than a half century of devastation and depopulation due to war (from the 1648 cossack uprising through the Great Northern War, 1700-1721), Polish landlords resettled right-bank Ukraine by luring peasants from the more crowded western parts of Commonwealth Ukraine, as well as from across the border of Hetmanate Ukraine, with obligation-free leases for up to twenty years. By the 1750s and 1760s, then, these leases were coming to an end, and the process of enserfment was beginning. Compared to their compatriots to the west, these peasants still had a much easier lot, and a substantial number of them had managed to avoid barshchina requirements by 1768. Nevertheless, increased work obligations to landlords were becoming more widespread, and this no doubt played a role in rallying the broader population to rising against their predominantly Polish landlords.14 Still, the general decline in status was consistent for all Ukrainian peasants in rightbank Ukraine, Orthodox and Uniate alike. Although the socioeconomic causes seem more viable, this line of argumentation goes no further than the nationalist argument in explaining the violence of Ukrainians against Ukrainians in the uprising.
Notably missing from the literary memorials and historical assessments over the past two centuries is the perspective of the Ukrainian Uniates as victims of the massacre. Their fate within the Russian empire stifled their story. The second partition of Poland-Lithuania in 1793 moved the Russian border westward to absorb right-bank Ukraine. In 1794, Catherine II mounted a massive effort to convert all Uniates in this region (and after the third partition of 1795, in all of Volhynia) to Russian Orthodoxy.'1 Continued conversions by later tsars in 1839 and 1875 affected millions and formally eliminated the Uniate faith within the Russian empire. Under this policy of suppression, the Uniate voice was all but silenced within published documents and studies of the era of Koliivshchyna.
Bringing the Uniates back to the core of the story realigns the focal point of the violence to the religious tensions between Orthodox and Uniate Ukrainians. This realignment dispels arguments that rely on binary ethnic and social distinctions between "Poles" and "Ukrainians" and thereby undermines previous nationalist and socioeconomic explanations. In so doing, it is not my intent to suggest that religious causes were the sole factor behind the uprising. The causes were multilayered, with religious factors feeding into other existing grievances. A fresh look at the evidence, however, reveals confessional tensions, heightened by shifting political loyalties, to be the most critical cause of the 1768 uprising.
First, a focus on religious causes must recognize that the intense violence between Uniates and Orthodox at the heart of Koliivshchyna was an anomaly in Ukrainian history. While Khmel'nyts'kyi's campaign in the Slavic Review previous century endorsed powerful pro-Orthodox rhetoric that agitated against the spread of the Uniate faith to the Ruthenian population of the Commonwealth, the cossack rank-and-file nevertheless killed very few Uniates and did not harbor high anti-Uniate feelings, focusing their energies instead against Poles andJews.'6 Likewise, in the following century, cossack-led disruptions (haidamak attacks) in right-bank Ukraine and the large peasant uprisings of 1734 and 1750 there included Roman Catholic clergy among their victims, but Uniates were not targets.17 By 1768, however, the dynamic of Uniate-Orthodox relations had shifted, and the hostility of the cossack-led rebels against the Uniate Church was real enough to count Uniates among the mass victims of the uprising.
What exactly had changed at this time in the Polish-Russian borderland that allowed for the escalation of Uniate-Orthodox tensions to the point of bloodshed? And, more generally, how do these circumstances illustrate the integration of political and religious goals? The answer, I argue, lies in the strengthened Dnepr River border that became not only a political boundary but also a dividing-line for religious identities among the Ukrainians living on either side of it. Conflicting political and religious loyalties led to unprecedented hostilities that pitted Ukrainians against Ukrainians. From this nucleus of tension, which led to the largest massacre of Uniates in Ukraine, the uprising fed into long-standing socioeconomic and political grievances against the more traditional "enemies" of Poles and Jews. In its closer alignment to Roman Catholic theology and practices, the Uniate culture became more differentiated from Orthodoxy than had been the case in the previous century.
As right-bank Ukraine was resettled in the early eighteenth century, landlords ensured that functioning parishes met the religious needs of the peasantry. The landlord not only helped with the funding for the church (though here the community also had a crucial role) and designated the plot of land that would sustain the parish priest but also had the final word on the selection of the parish priest. For a peasantry that followed Eastern Rite Christianity, the landlord could approve either a Uniate or Orthodox priest. In the face of ineffective Orthodox Church organization in the eastern palatinates at this time, Polish landlords resettling the area for the most part installed Uniate priests brought from adjacent Uniate dioceses and built Uniate churches, resulting in the gradual conversion of the peasantry in right-bank Ukraine to the Uniate faith.
In just a few decades, then, the Uniate Church made dramatic progress in expanding its jurisdiction eastward until the eastern border of the 
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Jablonowski estates in the Czyhyryn (Czehryni) starosta, for example, obtained consent in 1758 to send their candidate for their new parish to Pereiaslav for ordination by Bishop Gervasii.36 After training the candidate according to the Russian Orthodox standards, the bishop procured a written promise from the prospective parish priest to fulfill three requirements: (1) to take an oath of loyalty and obedience to the Empress Elizabeth and to the heir of the Russian imperial throne, Peter Fedorovich; (2) to promise "to cling to the Eastern Orthodox Greek-Russian Confession [vostochnopravoslavnoe grekorossiiskoe ispovedanie] without hypocrisy and to the end of my life, and never under any circumstances to convert to any other confession or religion"; and finally, (3) to fulfill all the necessary duties to the parish.37 In other words, loyalty to the Russian state and to the Russian Orthodox faith was the leading matter of priority.
In this fashion, the number of Orthodox parishes in this corner of the Commonwealth under Bishop Gervasii'sjurisdiction gradually expanded, and Melkhizedek was charged by Pereiaslav with duties of managing these parishes.38 The pastoral concern evidenced by Melkhizedek and his monks encouraged Orthodox priests of already existing parishes in this district to start asking Bishop Gervasii for stronger spiritual ties to his see, for "adoption" (usynovlenie) into the Pereiaslav eparchy.39 As with the newly installed priests, Bishop Gervasii accepted these "adopted" priests into his eparchy together with their parishes on the understanding that their "duty" was "to support firmly the Orthodox faith, and, in times of persecution, not forsaking life and not straying into non-Orthodox faith 
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These conflicts added to growing daily Russian pressure on Polish King Stanislaw August to support legislation that would guarantee traditional rights and privileges for religious dissidents.48 In January 1766, the king ordered the Uniate clergy to cease any "acts of persecution" against the Orthodox population, especially forcing any conversions to the Uniate faith, and issued a decree confirming rights and privileges for the Orthodox residents of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.49 Bending to external political pressures from Russia, Stanislaw August did not seem to recognize the internal political implications of guaranteeing rights to the Orthodox in this corner of his realm. In effect, the king had given the Bishop of Pereiaslav a free hand to continue extending his jurisdiction into the lands of the Commonwealth and to nurture loyalties to the Russian monarch.
Accordingly, Bishop Gervasii praised the "most merciful" and "most glorious" Russian empress in his pastoral letters to the Orthodox residents of the Commonwealth. Moreover, he used rhetoric that was pointedly anti-Catholic, and thereby anti-Polish, advancing the concept that the Orthodox population in the Commonwealth had been victims of the "cruel and violent behavior" of the Catholic Church, "being daily and violently forced into union with the Roman Church."50 The Pereiaslav bishop asked his parishioners to thank God, Catherine II, and the King and officials of the Commonwealth, in that order, appealing to them to "have eternal gratitude to the most Orthodox Monarch of All Russia, who has so actively and with such effort helped you" (in her promotion of rights for the Orthodox).51 This emphasis on Catherine II's support for Orthodox rights in effect made the Orthodox communities in the right bank comfortable with political loyalties that rejected the Commonwealth.
In the years leading up to 1768, the Uniate-Orthodox conflict intensified. Orthodox representatives became increasingly aggressive in their goals of moving back the frontlines of the Uniate faith, recruiting cossacks to help them violently seize churches, beating and driving away the Uniate priests in the process. In late 1765, Uniate Metropolitan Felicjan Wolodkowicz issued desperate complaints to Warsaw, blaming Bishop Gervasii outright for the ensuing violence. 86. "Opis kr6tki rzezi," 300. 87. Serczyk, Koliszczyzna, 98. The students were both Polish Catholics and Ukrainian Uniates.
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